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An Evolutionary Developmental Approach to
Cultural Evolution
by Claes Andersson, Anton To¨rnberg, and Petter To¨rnberg
Evolutionary developmental theories in biology see the processes and organization of organisms as crucial for
understanding the dynamic behavior of organic evolution. Darwinian forces are seen as necessary but not sufficient
for explaining observed evolutionary patterns. We here propose that the same arguments apply with even greater
force to culture vis-a`-vis cultural evolution. In order not to argue entirely in the abstract, we demonstrate the
proposed approach by combining a set of different models into a provisional synthetic theory and by applying this
theory to a number of short case studies. What emerges is a set of concepts and models that allow us to consider
entirely new types of explanations for the evolution of cultures. For example, we see how feedback relations—both
within societies and between societies and their ecological environment—have the power to shape evolutionary
history in profound ways. The ambition here is not to produce a definitive statement on what such a theory should
look like but rather to propose a starting point along with an argumentation and demonstration of its potential.
Introduction
Highly schematically one can speak of two dominant ap-
proaches to Paleolithic culture: (i) an ecological/economical
approach (EA) that is largely based on behavioral ecology and
economical constraints like time consumption, portability,
and so on; (ii) a physiological approach (PA) that emphasizes
physiology, in particular cognition, as an enabler and con-
straint on culture (see also Foley and Lahr 2003 for a similar
factorization). Neither approach makes sense on its own, and
controversy typically concerns the relative importance of the
forces that they represent. Both moreover share a common
neo-Darwinian model of adaptation where natural selection
is seen as the sole provider of evolutionary direction; to the
extent that other factors enter into consideration, they sit
uneasily on the margins of this framework.1
The PA is pervasive but rarely championed explicitly; Rich-
ard Klein typically serves as its embodiment (and lightning
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rod) in the literature (Klein 1995, 2000; Klein and Edgar
2002). Its persistence stems largely from that it is hard to see
how a cognitive technological potential could have persisted
untapped over extended periods of time. This logic dictates
that technological stasis and transitions must be tied to cog-
nitive capabilities that, due to strong selection for the tools
and strategies that they afford, would rapidly come to realize
their highest expressions. These capabilities are typically en-
visioned as providing distinct powers—such as the ability to
conceive of higher dimensional structure, symbolism, mul-
ticomponent tools, and so on—that will leave distinct traces
in the archaeological record. Transitions would then be true
watershed events, triggered by the advent of new cognitive
capabilities and marking the first appearance of new behavior
and the last appearance of old obsolete behavior, with the
best known example no doubt being the concept of “behav-
ioral modernity” (see, e.g., Henshilwood and Marean 2003).
The EA is often contrasted to the more paleontological (in
terms of both artifact and hominid taxonomy) approach of
the PA. It emphasizes geographically and temporally varying
environmental selection pressures, and cognition is seen more
as a capability for variability than as a set of fixed capacities.
The EA therefore maintains a much more generous comfort
level to archaeology and paleontology being “out of sync,”
such as when one hominid form exhibits considerable vari-
1. Indeed, elements of developmental reasoning can be found through-
out the paleoanthropology literature, and we will employ several of these
elements; examples include the invention cascades model by Schiffer
(2005), the broad spectrum hypothesis by Flannery (1969), the role and
significance of modified lithic technology outlined by Davidson and
McGrew (2005), and the evolution of home bases by Rolland (2004).
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ation in cultural style and complexity (e.g., withinH. sapiens),
or when several hominid forms share style and complexity
(e.g., between H. sapiens and H. neanderthalensis). So since
there is indeed a considerable “lack of sync” between hominid
stones and bones, the PA has come to be seen by many as a
Procrustean bed for archaeology, picking and choosing what
appears to be of use for reconstructing an elegant hominid
phylogeny.
To mention only a small selection of reviews and finds that
contribute to the feeling that the PA is under siege empirically,
McBrearty and Brooks (2000) and McBrearty (2007) consider
a wide range of Middle Stone Age (MSA) reports of artifact
types often taken to be diagnostic of the Upper Paleolithic
(UP). In a recent review, Shea (2011) finds that the idea of
Mode 4 technology being unique to some behaviorally mod-
ern UP/Later Stone Age (LSA) variant of H. sapiens has no
archaeological support. McCall (2006) and Soriano et al.
(2007) review theMSAHowiesons-Poort evidence concluding
that it was a separate and recursive tradition not ancestral to
UP technology. Hovers and Kuhn (2006) collect studies of
intermittent “modernity” in the European Lower Paleolithic
(LP) and Middle Paleolithic (MP). Schlebusch et al. (2012)
revealed, based on genetic evidence, that the Khoe-San of
southern Africa diverged as a group circa 100 kya (kya p
1,000 years ago), which is at least 50 kya before the UP/LSA
and a presence of H. sapiens outside of Africa and the Levant.
Some LP sites, moreover, give evidence of notable complexity
in nonlithic culture, for example, Gesher Benot Yaaqov (Go-
ren-Inbar 2011), Scho¨ningen (Thieme 1997, 2005), and Bil-
zingsleben (Mania and Mania 2005; Mania et al. 1994). Fi-
nally, Bednarik (2011) documents a large collection of possible
paleoart finds from the LP and onward.
But the EA has still not been able to muster a satisfying
alternative that really absorbs and defuses the PA account.
First of all, the expected covariation between technology and
biotopes does not become clearly manifest until well into the
UP (Bocquet-Appel and Tuffreau 2009; Stiner and Kuhn
2006). Second, its explanations hover dangerously close to
what in evolutionary biology is known as the just-so-story
format (Gould and Lewontin 1979): in arguing how localized
phenomena can be seen as environmentally adaptive, highly
specific hypotheses may be produced, but these may be
blamed for offering little beyond a restatement of their own
basic assumption: “because it was adaptive.” Cultural evo-
lution appears as underdetermined as ever: sometimes chang-
ing dramatically for no apparent reason and sometimes sailing
through substantial external stress without much change at
all.
But we suspect an even more fundamental reason behind
this chronic lack of a resolution. Neo-Darwinian models are
based on a priori given selection pressures, which basically
reduces adaptation to optimization. This general model of
how evolutionary change happens is firmly entrenched and
shapes questions and answers alike.2 It leads us into seeing
processes as uninteresting transients, into assuming that
change must be due to exogenous triggers, and into thinking
that any and all features of an adapted system should match
some feature of an environment that is external and auton-
omous. With no disagreement on this level between the EA
and PA perspectives, there is full tacit agreement that there
really should be a perfect match between potential and ex-
pressed cultural capability. When there is not, the resolution
will be that we are wrong either about the capabilities or about
the environment. Although culture frequently takes center
stage, it is itself notably absent from the stage as a factor in
its own evolution; there is no room for explanations having
to do with how culture is organized, how it develops, and
how it interacts with other processes in the neo-Darwinian
framework (see also Sterelny 2011). The evolutionary con-
straints that the PA and EA represent are clearly supremely
relevant, but could the whole underlying model of adaptation
be misguided?
The present work represents the view that the evolution of
culture is channeled by endogenous developmental mecha-
nisms and an intermingling between cultural and noncultural
processes. By this, culture does not only become a crucially
important factor in its own evolution, it also becomes coupled
with processes unfolding over both longer and shorter scales
of time and space. We argue that we need to develop what
we call an evolutionary developmental approach if we are to
understand the origins and history of culture, and we view
our effort as a direct parallel of the corresponding approach
to evolutionary biology (see, e.g., Arthur 2011; Odling-Smee
et al. 2003; Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray 2001).
The ultimate purpose of this paper is to advocate an evo-
lutionary developmental approach to studying sociotechnical
evolution. To do this, we will develop a provisional evolu-
tionary developmental theory by combining a set of comple-
mentary models that all illuminate innovation processes in
different ways and on different levels of organization. We will
apply this theory to a set of brief case studies. The aim is not
to provide a final statement but rather to propose a starting
point and a way of being more concrete than what an ar-
gument entirely in the abstract would have been.
We begin by motivating the need for such a theory in
general. We then introduce the three models that we will adapt
and combine, developing a synthesis as we go along. The
concepts introduced are next elucidated using two short case
studies: the first focusing on organization and the second on
process. This is followed by a discussion about transitions,
stasis, and adaptation, and why the record of lithic technology
can be expected to poorly represent hominid capabilities and
adaptability.
2. Equilibrium models based on such an optimization logic can cer-
tainly be highly useful. What we take issue with is the (often tacit)
implication that it usefully characterizes the overall evolutionary process.
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The Evolutionary Development of
Sociotechnical Organization:
A Synthetic Model
Why We Need Evolutionary Developmental Models
Early Homo was the first animal as far as we know that had
in its possession a piece of knowledge that could not be bi-
ologically inherited and that it simply could not afford to lose.
But summoning culture to our service was a Faustian bargain:
its tremendous powers came at the price of eternal servitude.
It also set the stage for an extensive coevolution between
hominid culture, ecological niche, and physiology. Socially
and materially transmitted culture truly became a part of us
and we of it; it is shaped around us, and we around it, just
like any organ that happens to be a material part of our bodies.
The relation between ourselves, culture, and our environ-
ment mirrors that between heritable material, organism, and
environment, and the latter set of relations has been explored
by evolutionary developmental theories in biology. Evolu-
tionary developmental biology (see, e.g., Arthur 2011) tells
us that variation, and thereby evolution, cannot be under-
stood at the genetic level—in particular, not if we are inter-
ested in evolution in the long run. Put simply, variation in
phenotype must happen via variation in developmental tra-
jectories, so development strongly determines what can and
cannot arise, and while genes play a central role in devel-
opment, their role is highly complex and cannot be disen-
tangled from the rest of the developmental system. Niche
construction theory (see, e.g., Laland et al. 2007; Odling-Smee
et al. 2003) goes even further and breaks apart the neo-Dar-
winian delimitation between what adapts and what gets
adapted to. It sees organisms as not just adapted to their
ecological environments but also as adapting their environ-
ments to themselves. In the end, it becomes impossible to
decouple these processes from each other. This position and
approach to studying evolutionary biology are also repre-
sented in a more generalized form in developmental systems
theory (see, e.g., Griffiths and Gray 1994; Oyama et al. 2001).
These arguments apply even more strongly for culture,
where social structure, institutions, artifacts, and environ-
mental modifications constitute an adapted system that is also
the engine of its own adaptation. As evolution unfolds, this
apparatus is all the time present: it catalyzes, scaffolds, and
gets modified by evolutionary change both internally and ex-
ternally. Ideas, cultural representations, memes, routines, or
whatever we want to call them here, play a role roughly anal-
ogous to genes (although not quite; see, e.g., Andersson 2008,
2011b), which is to say that they are necessary but only in a
wider developmental context. So just like proponents of evo-
lutionary developmental theories argue that we must under-
stand ontogeny and the interplay between organisms and their
environment in order to understand organic evolution, we
argue that we must understand the processes and structures
of culture as well as how they interact with noncultural pro-
cesses in order to understand the evolution of culture.
These developmental theories challenge the neo-Darwinian
view of evolutionary change in ways that we believe are at
least as important for understanding how culture evolves. We
think that many of the current paradoxes and enigmas in
hominid evolution may be theoretical artifacts rather than
true features of the system under study; a simple change of
perspectives may turn some of these paradoxes into workable
problems or even dissolve them (see also Sterelny 2011). For
example, on a developmental view, the absence of notable
external change no longer implies stasis, nor the other way
around. Questions of the nature-or-nurture type are no longer
posed on either a binary either-or form or a quantitative form;
saying that something is 70% due to genetic factors makes
as little sense as saying that the operation of an internal com-
bustion engine is 70% due to the fuel and 30% to its me-
chanics. Also, large effects do not necessarily call for large
causes, and the original causes of large effects may well be
mundane, idiosyncratic, and probably impossible to find out
anyway. Besides, they are no longer even the most interesting
part of the story. What is really interesting are the processes
and organization that often stabilize the system but that some-
times amplify small events into landslides. These processes
combine environmental, physiological, and cultural factors,
and they are weaved together in bootstrapping processes that
largely feed on themselves; exogenous events and processes
of course remain important, but they are not the sole sources
of explanations.
If there is a need to frame Darwinism differently in evo-
lutionary biology, it would hardly be surprising if it needed
to be framed differently in paleoanthropology too. But we
cannot use biological theories as they stand to understand
culture. In fact, biological theories of this sort will mostly be
used as a source of overarching inspiration. We will mostly
use elements from innovation research set in present times,
where the processes and organization of societies are there
studied together in a way that suits our purposes. What we
do here is select three models that each cover an important
part of the dynamics that we think should be better under-
stood in cultural evolution. Together they become more than
their sum; they have to be readapted from their original areas
of application, and we need to stitch them together into a
coherent framework. We will do this as we introduce them.
Exaptive Bootstrapping
First out is what we call the exaptive bootstrapping model
(see Lane 2002, 2011; Lane and Maxfield 2005; Lane et al.
2009). Innovation3 processes are conceptualized as transfor-
mation processes in an agent-artifact space where any trans-
formation potentially triggers a reconfiguration of the entire
fabric. New configurations of agents may change how artifacts
3. We use the distinction between invention and innovation intro-
duced by Schumpeter (1934), where innovation is the process by which
inventions become adopted and fixed in the population.
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are used and trigger changes in the artifacts. These changes
in turn have an impact on agents’ roles and interactions. Five
steps in what we call the internal innovation cycle are iden-
tified: “(i) new artifact types are designed to achieve some
particular attribution of functionality; (ii) organizational
transformations are constructed to proliferate the use of to-
kens of the new type; (iii) new patterns of human interaction
emerge around these artifacts in use; (iv) new attributions of
functionality are generated to describe what the participants
are obtaining or might obtain from them; (v) new artifacts
are conceived and designed to instantiate the new attributed
functionality” (Lane 2011, 69). Since points i and v coincide,
we have a bootstrapping process that, since each cycle may
lead to more than one new cycle, is prone to cascading.
Exaptation (Gould and Vrba 1982)—the principle by which
an artifact can be put to uses other than those originally
intended—enters between steps iii and iv and is identified as
a major mode of innovation (see also, e.g., Davidson and
McGrew 2005; Rolland 2004), where the exaptive process is
described but not named). The internal innovation cycle
brings out the dichotomy of radical versus incremental in-
novation, where the former involves changes in function while
the latter is of a faster-better-cheaper type. The latter is less
prone to cascading, since it does not directly disrupt config-
urations in agent-artifact space.4
To further illustrate how internal innovation cycles can play
themselves out, let us consider the application of culturally
transmitted strategies. Application of cultural knowledge en-
tails a production of situational knowledge that adapts and
combines strategies to local conditions. Most such knowledge
is for immediate use and discard (Lorentz 1977). Some will,
however, be candidates for generalization and incorporation
into the culturally transmitted package. So by simply using
culturally carried knowledge, possible improvements in the
zone of proximal development (Vygotsky 1978) will reveal
themselves to the practitioners (Schiffer 2005). This process
is necessary for adaptation to changing circumstances to be
possible: retaining what appears to work, removing what ap-
pears not to work, and solving problems. Each addition will
furthermore reveal new sets of possible novelty, calling for
even more change in a cascading mode of growth.
Davidson and McGrew (2005) explain how lithic technol-
ogy may be crucial in this respect, since it lends itself to general
usage of exceptionally wide applicability, such as cutting,
scraping, and piercing. Apart from affording the potential to
branch out into many types of more specialized tools, lithic
tools may also be used for fashioning (and from the early
MP/MSA become part of; see, e.g., Mazza et al. 2006; Rots
and Van Peer 2006; Rots et al. 2011) secondary implements,
giving a tremendous leverage on their range of uses and on
4. It might however also cause cascades under certain circumstances,
e.g., via threshold effects. If the cost of some practice drops, it may
suddenly become useful in applications that were formerly uneconomical;
this would lead to exaptation and functional change.
their propensity for generating open-ended skill systems.
Around these implements, new patterns of use may appear,
paving the way for ever more addition and change. Just as
important in this respect may be the rarity of suitable raw
material, as evidenced by its conscious transportation already
in the Oldowan (e.g., Braun et al. 2008; Stout et al. 2010).
Even without diversifying or specializing function, there was
a consistent potential for sophistication through the entire
production chain, from raw material procurement to tool use:
higher quality raw material, caching of raw materials and
tools, exchange, sharing, control over the shapes of produced
flakes, retouch of worn tools to renew or change properties,
and so on (for a review of how lithic technological organi-
zation is currently viewed, see Andrefsky 2009).
But there are also innovation processes meditated by en-
vironmental and physiological systems. If we look at the in-
ternal innovation cycle as analogous to evolutionary devel-
opmental biology processes, the external innovation cycle can
be seen as the sociotechnical counterpart of niche construc-
tion.
Let us consider a hypothesis about the MP-UP transition
along lines similar to the broad spectrum revolution hypoth-
esis (Flannery 1969; Stiner et al. 2000) and mutual exclusion
between cultural groups (O’Connell 2006). The LP and MP
saw a development from a broad opportunistic subsistence
base (e.g., Steele 2010) toward a more narrow subsistence
focused on big game predation (e.g., Hoffecker 2009; Pe´rez-
Pe´rez et al. 2003; Villa and Lenoir 2009). With the UP, this
development is followed by a new broadening of the subsis-
tence base, where big game hunting is complemented by a
much wider array of low-level resources (see, e.g., Hoffecker
2009; Richards and Trinkaus 2009; Richards et al. 2000; Stiner
et al. 2000). This development can be tied to the emergence
of higher technological variability in UP technology (see, e.g.,
Hoffecker 2009; Kuhn and Stiner 2001; Stiner and Kuhn
2006), and it can be suspected to produce an ecological ratchet
effect (see fig. 1). A broader subsistence base reduces risk and
increases the ecological carrying capacity, which leads to
higher population density. This would in turn inevitably lead
to smaller areas per capita for subsistence and to the destruc-
tion of the previous niche of relying more heavily on big
game. So there is no going back from such innovations, and
for each step that is taken the pressure to take another step
in the same direction will remain strong.
External innovation cycles may continually have operated
on any scale and via any external system that can act as a
ratchet, most importantly physiological adaptation such as
changed cognitive capabilities. Its main preconditions may
have been around for a long time, and its trigger would be
some kind of novelty behind which an unknown amount of
generativity happens to hide. Such a portal innovation may
be entirely inconspicuous since its generativity is not intrinsic
to it: each step creates the conditions for new steps and acts
in various ways to block backsliding. It is thought, for ex-
ample, that modified lithics arose in relation to large mammal
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Figure 1. Possible bootstrapping cycle maintaining pressure for sociotechnical change. Such a positive feedback loop could keep
on going as long as the sociotechnical system afforded new paths forward.
scavenging (e.g., Heinzelin et al. 1999; Semaw et al. 2003;
Domı´nguez-Rodrigo et al. 2005); the future generativity of
this technology millions of years down the line obviously
played no role in its original adoption and development.
Generative Entrenchment
The generative entrenchment model (Wimsatt 1999; Wimsatt
and Griesemer 2007) was originally devised in evolutionary
biology as a model of how new features always assume the
presence of, and adapt to, earlier features. If exaptive boot-
strapping describes the explosive side of innovation, gener-
ative entrenchment describes how basically the same processes
cause the dynamics to jam up to generate powerful dynamical
lock-in effects. The central insight is that apart from the fitness
of the novelty itself, we must also consider the fitness of the
cascade of reconfigurations that must take place for novelty
to fit into an existing and fine-tuned system. The more fun-
damental the locus of change, the more other things will be
affected by the change, so the larger will the cascade effects
be and the higher the likelihood that it will bring about mal-
adaptive effects that cancel whatever benefit that the original
novelty brought. This tends to lead—as it has in the orga-
nization of genetic networks (Shubin et al. 1997), biological
body plans (Arthur 2011), and modern society (Wimsatt
2013)—to a hierarchy whose low-level parts have general and
abstract functions that rarely change and whose high-level
parts are progressively more adaptively flexible.
Generative entrenchment brings out a second spectrum of
innovation types: deep versus superficial innovation. Deep
innovation affects lower parts of the hierarchy, tending to
triggers larger cascades. These will be rare but have dramatic
and sweeping effects. Superficial innovation affects higher and
more flexible parts and tends to generate smaller cascades.
They will be more frequent and less disruptive. Radical in-
novation is therefore progressively less likely to enter into the
system the more fundamental the affected component is. Sub-
stantive refinement of function through incremental inno-
vation will however be present in fundamental components
since these are likely to remain for a long time in a stable
context. In effect, this means that the bottom levels will be
selected for exaptability through generality: the wider the
range of functionalities that they afford in dependent parts
further up in the hierarchy, the more adaptable will the system
as a whole be.
The Multilevel Perspective
Also addressing the proneness of cultures to lock-in is the
multilevel perspective (see Geels 2010; Geels and Kemp 2012;
Geels and Schot 2007), which focuses on what conditions that
need to obtain for fundamental transitions to take place. Dif-
ferent areas of activity—say, storage, food preparation, do-
mestic fire handling, construction of dwelling structures, for-
aging, hunting, raw material procurement, and so on—would
here be referred to as sociotechnical regimes organized into a
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sociotechnical system. Regimes evolve to become specialized
and separated to reflect differences in function. But at the
same time they will become entangled and coordinated: hor-
izontally because they are all part of a larger project of main-
taining the well-being of the society and vertically because
they will rely on and share more entrenched and fundamental
technology and practices.
Regimes will come to serve certain functions in relation to
one another, and by fitting well into the sociotechnical system,
important and well-connected regimes have an “internal fit-
ness” that can trump even substantial “external fitness” of
challenging regimes.5 Regimes will also be resilient to radical
changes in their function for the exact same reason. Most
innovation will be incremental and channeled into the re-
gimes, essentially making them better, faster, and cheaper
while preserving their function. Moreover, the hierarchical
arrangement described by generative entrenchment will apply
both within and between regimes: some parts of them will
be more free to change while others will be more entrenched,
and in the same way, some regimes will be more dynamical
and others more static.
The sociotechnical system, along with all other relevant
aspects of the environment (other groups, ecology, climate,
etc.), collectively form what is referred to in the multilevel
perspective as a landscape. Changes and shifts in this land-
scape are generated both within and outside of the socio-
technical system, often gradually and over time. Since the
landscape contains the regimes, it will pull these, as it were,
and generate stress in their configurations. As stress builds,
rifts may form in the sociotechnical system as regimes come
to fit in poorly, reducing their internal fitness, and offering
windows of opportunity for fundamental change.
Whether or not a transition really will take place depends
on the availability of challenging minor regimes.6 Minor re-
gimes fill important but more specialized roles, and they serve
an important role in the innovation dynamics because they
sometimes turn out to be exaptable into more major roles.
Modern examples include things like specialized types of pro-
pulsion, materials, energy production, and so on in niche
applications (e.g., military, space) where ad hoc inventiveness
is called for, or for that matter major regimes unique to certain
countries, cultures, and so on. The reason why regime-level
radical innovation needs a long period of relative isolation as
a minor regime is that whole new systems of practices do not
appear overnight and a minor regime must have developed
5. A modern example is the use of fossil fuels. Everything from engine
designs to extraction (of resources), conversion (into fuel), distribution
(of fuel), consumer expectations, infrastructure, and workforce training
are finely tuned and adapted to their use. So even if new technologies
have a demonstrably better potential, they will still face an uphill battle:
the incumbent technology has constructed the entire niche in which the
fight will play itself out.
6. Referred to as niches in MLP—a terminology choice that we think
would be confusing in this context.
quite a bit before it can hope to take on even a crippled major
regime.
Brief Demonstrations
We will here employ the concepts that we have introduced
to analyze two brief case studies. The primary purpose is to
demonstrate the applicability of the framework to historical
processes more in general, to test whether the framework
promises to have any bite as a method for integrating and
analyzing a heterogeneous collection of stylized facts.
The Synthetic Model in Context
Let us consider (mostly) the organization of Acheulean com-
munities from the Gesher Benot Yaaqov (GBY) site (∼800
kya) as described by Goren-Inbar (2011). Rich assemblages
are found in 15 horizons covering a time period of approx-
imately 100 ky, and they provide evidence on a level of res-
olution that is rare for sites of such antiquity.
Two major regimes can be particularly well established: (i)
raw material procurement and (ii) lithic production. GBY
hominids primarily used basalt as raw material in their giant
core Acheulean lithic technology. The basalt was quarried
from nearby locations whose selection demonstrates intimate
knowledge of rock properties relevant for tool production.
Slabs were reduced to smaller pieces using methods out of
which at least two have left persistent traces: large rock per-
cussors and levers, the latter being inferred from characteristic
notches present on slabs. Many parts of the quarrying prac-
tices cannot be reconstructed, but it is clear that quarrying
must have been a collective activity. What emerges is a co-
herent sociotechnical regime consisting of a system ofmultiple
types of artifacts, individuals, knowledge, and sites, and whose
continuity can be confirmed over a time span of 50 ky (Sharon
et al. 2011). Since it can be inferred, as Goren-Inbar (2011)
does by considering an ethnographic case (Pe´trequin and Pe´-
trequin 1993), that considerable detailed knowledge and non-
trivial strategies were needed, this continuity indicates that
the regime was passed on across generations with great fidelity.
We can safely infer that the quarrying regime was partic-
ularly strongly entangled with the tool production regime.
This regime can also be confirmed over a span of 50 ky and
was no less based on transmitted expert knowledge. Both soft
and hard percussors were used, and a high level of knowledge
and control is evidenced by the fact that despite great vari-
ability in blank properties, the resulting tools were remarkably
uniform. Indicative of transmission is also a substantial sim-
ilarity with African Acheulean tool types and morphology of
the same era. Moreover, Goren-Inbar (2011) notes that basalt
is hard to process, and basalt knapping is considered to rep-
resent the highest level of expertness among ethnographically
studied biface knappers in Irian Jaya (Pe´trequin and Pe´trequin
1993).
We also see the base of a hierarchy: although the higher
160 Current Anthropology Volume 55, Number 2, April 2014
level regimes leave few persistent traces, the low-level lithic
tools were obviously used in several roles. Some direct uses
of lithic tools, all of which can be interpreted as representing
sociotechnical regimes, have however been documented, such
as nut cracking (Goren-Inbar et al. 2002) and butchering (e.g.,
Rabinovich et al. 2008). There is also evidence of wood-
working (Goren-Inbar et al. 1992), which strongly suggests a
general material processing use of basic lithic tools; this has
also been verified for other Acheulean sites, such as in Scho¨n-
ingen (∼400 kya; Thieme 1997) and Peninj (∼1.5mya [million
years ago]; Domı´nguez-Rodrigo et al. 2001). At Scho¨ningen,
wooden javelins were found along with cutting tools and
retouching tools, indicating both the existence, connection,
and something about the internal structures of three regimes:
(i) a tool production regime, (ii) a higher level woodworking
regime supported by the tool regime, and (iii) a big game
hunting regime supported by the woodworking regime. Im-
plied are, for example, raw material provision regimes and a
carcass-processing regime.
The GBY site also provides early evidence of persistent
domestication of fire (Goren-Inbar et al. 2004), predating
widespread use by several hundred millennia (Roebroeks and
Villa 2011; Rolland 2004). The same goes for the systematic
use of fish as a source of nutrition, which is seen at the GBY
site long before this becomes commonplace in the Upper
Paleolithic. Fire use appears likely to have been a local major
regime that was strongly linked to many other practices, while
the exploitation of fish more likely represents a locally minor
regime complementing more major subsistence strategies. Ex-
ceptions like these are the rule in the archaeological record.
For instance, despite the strong emphasis on big game hunting
during the MP, numerous examples exist of exploitation of
small and hard-to-catch resources (see Gaudzinski-Windheu-
ser and Niven 2009), which is not to speak of the MSA, which
is replete with examples of local styles, ornaments, and tech-
nologies (McBrearty 2007; McBrearty and Brooks 2000). Al-
though there are no particular reasons to believe that the GBY
instances were ancestral to much later universalized regimes,
they demonstrate the existence of developed practices that
constitute minor regimes that could act as fodder for radical
innovation.
Early Human Sociotechnical Organization: Flexibility
and Conservatism
This case study will follow hominid organic and sociotech-
nical evolution through the emergence of a rudimentary
hunter-gatherer lifestyle and the spread of erectoids across the
Old World. The path that we have chosen through the thicket
of archaeological and paleontological evidence (and their in-
terpretations) is one that emphasizes the interplay between
diet, physiology, ecology, and the generativity of modified
lithic technology.
The emergence of the Oldowan around 2.6 mya (Semaw
et al. 2003) and its spread across east and south Africa would
be the first step toward establishing what we might call a
human sociotechnical organization. But it is likely that the
organization of the overall Oldowan sociotechnical system
would still essentially be that of the great apes, with a set of
quite separate regime systems rather than a hierarchy of re-
gimes. The reason why this can be suspected is that butchering
is the only verified use of Oldowan tools before the end of
that period. This suggests that the full generativity of lithics
(see the “Exaptive Bootstrapping” sec.) does not appear to
have come into play yet at this point. While there exist in-
dications of uses of lithics besides butchering in the early
Oldowan (Beyries 1993), the evidence is tenuous (Domı´n-
guez-Rodrigo et al. 2005). So it appears likely that if such
uses existed, they would have constituted minor regimes—
paving the way for, but not yet constituting, a more complex
organization that lay ahead.
We propose that the human sociotechnical organization
originated in the realization that lithics affordedmanipulation
of a wide range of materials besides animal carcasses. This
general affordance provided exceptional leverage in terms of
the range of implements that could be made (Davidson and
McGrew 2005). This is an example of what we mean by a
portal innovation: its generative effects on the sociotechnical
system cannot have been part of the reason why it was initially
adopted into a general role. Modified lithics would sneak in
under and transform virtually all activity that relied on pro-
cessed materials, and in the process it would also over time
spawn new such activities that had previously been unthink-
able; e.g., spears, hafted points, big game hunting, hide work-
ing. The scene was set for a major reorganization of the
sociotechnical system: from something resembling the or-
ganization of great ape technology to a hierarchy with a
strongly entrenched base and more and more flexible regimes
upward.
Signs of such a shift appear toward the end of the Oldowan
and the beginning of the Acheulean. The earliest direct sign
is evidence found in late east African Oldowan tools (Beyries
1993; Keeley and Toth 1981) of the application of lithics to
a wider variety of materials, and in Acheulean tools of similar
age (Domı´nguez-Rodrigo et al. 2001). Another sign suggestive
of an external innovation cycle is concurrent transformations
involving physiology, cultural organization, and ecological in-
teractions. The shift between H. habilis and H. ergaster brings
many physiological changes, such as an increase in body mass,
encephalization, a reduction in masticatory musculature and
postcanine tooth size, and an adaptation to a more modern
mobility pattern with an essentially modern postcranial anat-
omy and thermoregulation (Plummer 2004; Wood and Strait
2004). It also brings evidence of behavioral changes including
food sharing, change in land use patterns, and in general the
emergence of a rudimentary hunter-gatherer lifestyle (see, e.g.,
Snodgrass et al. 2009 for a review). The first hominids found
outside of Africa (at Dmanisi, Georgia, ∼1.75 mya; Vekua et
al. 2002) are also dated approximately to this period, and H.
erectus is subsequently found all over the Old World in a wide
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range of biotopes. The thesis that a new sociotechnical or-
ganization can have emerged that provided key abilities from
early on is buttressed (i) by the fact that Dmanisi tools are
Oldowan in character rather than Acheulean, (ii) by the prim-
itive physiology of the Dmanisi hominids (they were not fully
developed erectoids; see Vekua et al. 2002), and (iii) by the
low frequency of bifaces in east Asia and the generally low
affinity to western Acheulean bifaces in those that have been
found (Norton et al. 2006; Petraglia and Shipton 2008). This
pattern would then be consistent with a migration initiated
early during the external innovation cycle. The characteristic
Acheulean bifaces would be an effect as much as a cause of
this transition.
The early human sociotechnical organization certainly wit-
nessed substantial flexibility relative to ecology and climate,
but notably no trend toward diversification in resource ex-
ploitation. To the contrary, as mentioned in the Exaptive
Bootstrapping section, the trend was toward narrowing and
climbing higher in the trophic system, and the Neanderthals
finally occupied a niche at the very top, typically specializing
heavily on one or a few species (see, e.g., Gaudzinski 2006;
Gaudzinski-Windheuser and Niven 2009; Kuhn and Stiner
2006; Stiner 2002). A logical development would be to follow
the path of refining exploitation strategies for the best yielding
resources that were already targeted and for which consid-
erable sociotechnical adaptation had been achieved: that is,
to move to larger game and toward being able to target them
as efficiently as possible, that is, fat-rich prime adults rather
than only young and infirm animals. The early modern so-
ciotechnical organization would be hierarchical and exhibit a
system of linked regimes, but they would primarily be sub-
servient to an ever-narrowing set of top-level regimes by
which the groups would live and die. Few of these, perhaps
(at least locally) only one, would be directed at obtaining
food. The sociotechnical system developed to maximize out-
put and minimize risk, but it did so path-dependently and
constrained by its own organization. The sociotechnical or-
ganization of the UP/LSA, which we might have called the
modern human sociotechnical organization if we were to deal
with it here, would be tempting to characterize as a break
with the pattern of homing in more and more closely on
bigger and bigger prey to that of being able to home in on
several targets at the same time and to be able to swiftly change
targets as needed. This is clearly not possible to achieve by
the incremental improvement of a big game hunting regime,
and reliance on such a regime must have been exceptionally
hard to break out of. Everything from technology to hunting
practices, dwelling places, group structure and size, social in-
teraction strategies (within and between groups), and con-
ceptions of value and identity would be coadapted to the





Taphonomic processes have left us almost exclusively with
two inert parts of ancient hominids to pore over: their skel-
etons and their small lithic technology. But if lithic technology
mainly, and in particular early on, belonged to basic and
strongly entrenched regimes, such a bias could play tremen-
dous tricks on us today. Adaptability and inventiveness would
largely be archaeologically invisible, and rare signs of behav-
ioral complexity beyond what is evidenced by lithics would
seem either paradoxical or too fantastic to even consider se-
riously.7 It would only be at the rare points in time when
innovation affected the lithic core technology that clearly de-
tectable traces of sociotechnical change would be left behind.
During the prolonged periods of deep lock-in, lithics would
remain relatively static, and the archaeological record will be
uneventful and uniform despite considerable climatic and
ecological variations across time and space (see, e.g., Bocquet-
Appel and Tuffreau 2009; Foley and Lahr 2003; Kuhn and
Stiner 2001; Stout et al. 2010). Most lithic technology may
simply not have been in direct contact with geographically
and temporally variable parts of the environment but have
interacted on the basic level of materials such as meat, wood,
straw, hides, bone, antler, and so on. Inferring cultural stasis
and homogeneity on the basis of stasis and homogeneity in
lithics could in other words be akin to arguing that mice and
elephants must be similar because of a high similarity on the
cellular level—we would compare them on a level that is
strongly generatively entrenched and that simply is not the
main locus of variability. Indeed, with respect to raw material
availability, a point at which lithic skills were strongly and
directly exposed to environmental variability, considerable
variation does occur over time and space (see Kuhn and Stiner
2001).
Regime Change: Adaptation and Revolution
Due to functional entanglement and specialization, regimes
cannot easily undergo radical innovation even when put un-
der substantial pressure. This pressure, however, may open
the door for the replacement of one regime by another regime
(see “The Multilevel Perspective” sec.). At the rare points
when this successfully took place in the lower parts of the
sociotechnical system, cascading (see the “Exaptive Bootstrap-
ping” sec.) reconfiguration could lead to revolutionary
change; when it occurred in the upper parts, the overall system
would be less disturbed. The multilevel perspective cites two
main preconditions for regime replacement: (i) a window of
opportunity whereby one or more regimes begin to fit in
poorly and (ii) readily deployable alternatives to such regimes,
7. For example, seafaring H. erectus (Bednarik 2003, 2011).
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that is, minor regimes. If either of these two preconditions is
lacking, status quo will remain (e.g., Geels and Schot 2007).
The basic mechanics of window-of-opportunity formation
can be summarized as follows. Stress builds up as sociotech-
nical regimes strive to configure themselves to match the ex-
ternal environment, horizontally between the regimes, and
vertically to the locked-in core parts of the system. Over time,
stress may reach a point where internal adaptation between
parts of the system begins to lag considerably. Strong selection
pressures and new affordances will come to persist without
being effectively pursued, and regimes will find it increasingly
hard to accommodate needed changes. The internal fitness
that a major regime enjoys as a central and well-integrated
part of the sociocultural system will be diminished, and we
may speak of a window of opportunity opening up since
external selection pressures now have stronger relative im-
portance.
The most common type of window was probably due to
changes in the relative availability of resources. We expect that
the sociotechnical system was adapted to deal expediently
precisely with that sort of change through superficial recon-
figurations. But over longer time scales, drawn-out directional
climatic change occurred, not least due to glaciation cycles,
and substantial organic evolution unfolded. This could slowly
open up deep rifts in the sociotechnical system, beyond what
could be dealt with by superficial reorganization. As stress
increased, windows would open up more andmore frequently
and widely, with deeper and more frequent reorganizations
leaving detectable but still isolated and recursive archaeolog-
ical traces behind. Then, eventually, a deep radical innovation
would turn out to be a portal innovation and come to sweep
the board. This would be what we now detect as a shift be-
tween the major technological modes.
As suggested in the Archaeological Homogeneity section,
radical innovation seems not to have been the weapon of
choice for adaptation. The entrenched core regimes would
instead have been under pressure to undergo incremental
innovation to become as configurable as possible so as to
make the top tiers more flexible and thereby reduce the need
to change the core. What were the evolutionary dynamics of
core regimes? Delagnes and Meignen (2006), for example,
trace the fate of different debitage methods (Levallois, dis-
coidal, and Quina) across the MP in France, and although
the Quina method appears late, the pattern conforms well to
what Kuhn (2006) finds in a similar study of the Italian MP,
namely that “flexibility seems to have been manifest mainly
through redeploying and recombining a limited range of tech-
nological options, not as the development of entirely new
technological solutions.” Kuhn (2006, 116) furthermore notes
that whatever temporal trajectories can be discerned are in
any event not in the direction of the UP.
The top of the hierarchy was the organ of external adap-
tation in the sociotechnical system, and most regime shifts
would thereby be superficial and quite uneventful. Regime
replacement, we hold, is realistic only if a suitable regime that
could be redirected without too much deep modification al-
ready existed. Developing a functional regime from scratch
under pressure would probably have had a very low likelihood
of success: such a regime would be unrefined, as it would not
represent accumulated time-tested knowledge, and those
forced to begin practicing it would not be highly skilled. The
presence of minor regimes was therefore likely to be highly
important for adaptability, and mobility was probably the
main strategy before sociotechnical flexibility became highly
developed. As an entirely conjectural example (along with
those in the sec. “The Synthetic Model in Context”), imagine
that the bow and arrow emerged as a toy for children, or
perhaps a display weapon, and underwent a good deal of
functional refinement in that role, that is, that it was turned
into a functioning but minor regime with practices, materials,
and production routines worked out. Then, if one day con-
ditions called for a broadening or alteration of the subsistence
base, this technology would be available as an option and
would not need to be conceived ex nihilo. With respect to
minor niches, complexity breeds complexity: the larger and
more diversified the culture, the more nooks and crannies
will there be in which such alternative ways of doing things
can thrive without being dominant.
Summary
In evolutionary biology, developmental models scaffold nat-
ural selection into a richer system of processes that arise from
the organization that evolution itself brings about. Natural
selection is seen as necessary but not sufficient for under-
standing the patterns of evolution. We have argued that the
corresponding move should be made in the study of cultural
evolution. To this end, we introduced a provisional synthetic
theory where three components from innovation research—
which is an area where sociotechnical organization and pro-
cess have lately been studied extensively—were brought to-
gether under a more overarching logic borrowed from evo-
lutionary developmental models from biology. The intention
was to demonstrate that a theory tailor-made for the purposes
can be developed. In some cases, concepts were immediately
useful, but in other cases they must be customized, abstracted,
and reapplied, and several “bridging concepts” had to be in-
troduced.
The result should not be viewed as a ready and delivered
framework, and the case studies should not be seen as its
definite explanations and predictions. It should be viewed as
a demonstration of a possibility and a starting point that is
sufficiently developed to provide leads for further exploration.
We think that a suggestive picture of the evolutionary de-
velopment of culture emerges as a result of this exercise, if
so only in outline. Unless earlier hominid culture operated
on radically different principles than that of more recent so-
cieties—and there are no reasons to believe that they did—
we have strong reasons to believe that such cultures came to
be organized hierarchically, with interlinked but compart-
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mentalized and specialized regimes, subject to strong conser-
vatism at the base and successively more flexibility toward the
top.
We furthermore think that this organization was far more
than just an adaptation to an environment: it opened up a
whole universe of new possibilities for the future. The emer-
gence of such an organization, which we have here suggested
can have occurred at the Oldowan-Acheulean transition,
could even be seen as a cultural version of the Cambrian
Explosion and the emergence of multicellularity in the bio-
logical world. It also suggests a candidate differentiation be-
tween human culture from animal culture on the basis of
organization.
We hypothesized that modified lithic technology would
have played a crucial role in this development by establishing
itself as the enabler and precondition—directly or indirectly—
for just about all hominid cultural activities. By serving gen-
eral material processing roles, it made secondary implements
and strategies possible, and these would form the upper tiers
of this hierarchy. With lithics entrenched at the base of the
sociotechnical system—analogous to cells in multicellular or-
ganisms—they would not need to change very much. Their
main design criterion would be to make change possible in
the upper tiers. In other words, they would be adapted to
allow flexibility, and we should not be surprised if they them-
selves were quite inert in the face of ecological heterogeneity.
The normal mode of change in response to ecological het-
erogeneity would instead have been superficial reconfigura-
tions in the upper levels of the sociotechnical system, and the
system as a whole would be adapted to allow such flexibility.
The mode of sociotechnical change over time would be char-
acterized by lock-ins and bootstrapping processes: phenom-
ena that we cannot even begin to consider unless we apply
an evolutionary developmental perspective.
But due to changes in systems external to culture—not
least physiological evolution and changes in ecology and cli-
mate—change also in the more fundamental parts of the so-
ciotechnical system would be inevitable sooner or later. When
such change did happen, it probably occurred in geographical
areas where the environmental conditions were such that the
threshold to such change locally happened to be lower. Once
the lock-in was broken, we identified what was referred to as
an external innovation cycle as a particularly important type
of change process. The external innovation cycle is related to
a lock-in roughly the way that positive self-reinforcement is
related to negative self-reinforcement: it is basically the same
mechanism operating in a different dynamical regime, and
both are due to the nonlinearity of evolutionary processes.
This innovation process is inspired by the logic of niche con-
struction theory whereby also systems external to culture are
brought along in the change process: cultural change comes
to generate ever-new basic conditions for more change and
at the same time block the path backward. Most importantly,
physiological evolution (e.g., cognitive evolution) and the de-
struction/construction of ecological niches could create such
ratchet effects. Once such a process was set off, it could per-
petuate itself without the need for external driving forces, just
like a lock-in can maintain itself despite external driving
forces.
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This is a bold attempt by nonarchaeologists to shift the nature
of the debate about cultural evolution using some theoretical
insights developed in evolutionary biology and industrial sys-
tems theory. The work is grounded in some insights into early
archaeological evidence—though not without relying on some
false friends along the way. Arguably, even more insight could
be gained by an evenmore penetrating analysis of the elements
of the archaeological story—but maybe that was not necessary
here.
I am delighted that one feature of their argument arises
frommy paper withMcGrew about the new niche constructed
from the incidental abandonment of stone flakes and cores
from the very beginning of stone toolmaking. Absent from
our paper, and theirs, is any real understanding of how long
it took for hominins to move from constructing the niche to
occupying it. Important progress on this problem has been
made by Matt Pope and Adam Brumm (personal commu-
nication, 2012)8 observing the incidence of bifacial cores re-
used after abandonment for a period long enough for them
to become patinated.
The authors point to the power of amplification of “small
events into landslides,” a process that Noble and I (e.g., Noble
and Davidson 1996) repeatedly pointed out as a recurrent
process in human evolution, but their view of it would have
been enhanced by placing more emphasis on the occurrence
of variation and the operation of selection on new variants.
It is my belief that the major building blocks and classifica-
tions on which archaeology has relied since the nineteenth
century are not a good starting point for that sort of analysis.
It would be nice to see a few more examples of the small
8. The editors of this journal may care to note that Pope and
Brumm’s important paper was rejected from Current Anthropology.
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things that turned into landslides: my favorites are the plano-
convex cores from Olduvai DK (Leakey 1971) or Peninj (de
la Torre et al. 2003) that could be rejuvenated and become
Levallois cores, and the fact that the intensification of the
exploitation of gazelles in the Natufian was followed by the
domestication of goats, which had been a minor element of
the faunal exploitation previously (see data in, e.g., Munro
2004).
It is, therefore, paradoxical that the authors rely on GBY
and the claim that its archaeology results from a single culture
that lasted 50,000 years—longer than the whole time modern
humans have been the dominant species on the planet. But
the essence of culture is that it is transmitted from culture-
holders to the culturally naive and that in that process of
teaching and learning there is ample opportunity for what
Henrich (2004) described as failure in cultural copying. Here,
I think, the explanation lies in a little-emphasized aspect of
the, surely inappropriate, comparison with toolmaking in
modern Papua New Guinea: the raw material is described as
hard-to-process basalt. Here then is a context in which equi-
finality might arise from the limited ways in which the raw
material can be worked—hence the uniformity may not be
due to inexplicably perfect and long-lasting cultural trans-
mission but a convergence on a method that works, perhaps
on many discrete occasions, including ultimately recent Papua
New Guinea. The attempted analogy actually works the other
way around.
Erella Hovers and Anna Belfer-Cohen
Institute of Archaeology, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem,
Jerusalem 91905, Israel (hovers@mscc.huji.ac.il, belferac@mscc.huji
.ac.il). 13 VI 13
Archaeology is notorious for being an empirical discipline
that borrows from many other, theory-driven branches of
research. We do not often see the archaeological record—a
proxy for cultural evolution (albeit a partial one, as stated
correctly by the authors)—being investigated by experts from
other disciplines, whose ambition is to offer “a starting point
. . . an argumentation and demonstration” for a new devel-
opmental approach to sociotechnical evolution. By the au-
thors’ own admission, the formal approach advocated here
borrows elements from evolutionary, optimal foraging, and
general systems theories, as well as the recently developed
theory of niche construction, in order to make sense of Pa-
leolithic culture. It is precisely because archaeologists are com-
pulsive borrowers of theories (e.g., Binford 2001) that much
of this new offering had already been embraced, for better or
worse, by prehistorians.
The advocated approach attempts to account for gene-cul-
ture-environment interfaces, but it fails to consider how par-
ticular cultural histories influence group and individual de-
cision making when interacting with their environment
(physical and social) at a given time. The authors claim that
a powerful sociotechnical lock-in, the emphasis on meat eat-
ing, had been operating and growing stronger from the Ol-
dowan to the Middle Paleolithic Neanderthals—perceived as
committed to carnivory. This time-transgressive intensifica-
tion directed cultural evolution in all its aspects. Thus, lithics
“evolved” mainly to accommodate the drive of getting more
meat in a more efficient way. The authors consider the MP-
UP transition as a break with the constriction imposed by
homing in more and more closely on bigger and bigger prey,
and the appearance of behavioral flexibility.
This scenario is inconsistent with the archeological data
throughout the relevant time span. The Oldowan techno-
system is potentially the only aspect of the Oldowan that
differs from the great apes. Still, the invention of Oldowan
stone flaking is built on behaviors known among apes (Hovers
2012; Read and van der Leeuw 2008). It is for this reason
that we disagree with the statement that Oldowan stone tools
respond to meat-processing needs and are associated strictly
with butchering. Great ape tool use does not encompass
butchering (and in fact does not include intentional stone
flaking in the wild; McGrew 2010). Moreover, isotopic, tooth
microwear, and tooth calculus findings indicate that the diet
of hominins from the Oldowan through the Middle Paleo-
lithic (as well as later) was variegated, regionally diverse, and
far from portraying the strong commitment to meat eating
envisioned by the authors (Cerling et al. 2013; El Zaatari et
al. 2011; Henry, Brooks, and Piperno 2011; Hockett 2012;
Speth 2010; Ungar and Sponheimer 2011; Ungar 2012).
Finds from the Acheulian site at GBY indeed speak to
developed cultural practices of early hominins. We concur
that such finds need not necessarily be considered as ancestral
to much later universalized regimes. Indeed, such finds may
evidence the now widely accepted concept that even major
inventions might have disappeared and reappeared as part of
the multitude of processes that constitute the “evolution of
culture” (e.g., Henrich 2004; Hovers and Belfer-Cohen 2006;
Powell, Shennan, and Thomas 2009; Premo and Kuhn 2010;
Shennan 2001). How, then, could they serve as “fodder for
radical innovation” in much later times? Implicit in the au-
thors’ statement is an entrenched belief in linearity, contrary
to the main trust of their approach. Their statement also
disregards the role of historical trajectories (e.g., context of
cultural transmission, demographics) that are proximal trig-
gers for the emergence and diversity of prehistoric cultural
innovations and institutions.
As archaeologists trained in lithic analysis, we are the first
to recognize the importance of lithic technology in under-
standing cultural evolution. Still, this is a far cry from the
reductive statement that lithic technology is “the enabler and
precondition . . . for just about all hominid cultural activities,”
a prime mover of all things. Perceiving of lithics as analogous
to cells in multicellular organisms defines culture and its prod-
ucts as just another biological organ. Biological evolution has
an important role in shaping the human condition, but only
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up to a point. Culture, including its material manifestations,
cannot be explained through biological models except on a
very abstract level of discourse. This is probably because one
has to take into consideration the fact that as complexity rises,
it can change the rules of the game. “Culture” made humans
“too clever by half” in the sense that our species acts contra
its biological “good” (Dawkins 1989).
Andersson, To¨rnberg, and To¨rnberg made a commendable
endeavor to test a theoretical model through archaeological
case studies, yet it results in a “just so story.” In spite of the
emphasis on flexibility and connectivity of cultural processes
and structures, the suggested model is rigid when it comes
to explaining the processes inferred from the archaeological
record. The authors came up with a typology of processes
rather than explanatory insights. What is sorely needed is a
middle-range theory that will bridge between valued theories
of complex systems on the one hand, the empirical archae-
ological data on the other, and the historical circumstances
that are responsible for cultural evolution.
Timothy A. Kohler
Department of Anthropology, Washington State University, Pull-
man, Washington 99164-4910, U.S.A. (tako@wsu.edu). 19 VI 13
Andersson and colleagues offer a set of stimulating and val-
uable suggestions for archaeologists seeking to explain in-
novation in the archaeological record from an evolutionary
perspective.9 I also appreciate their general argument that cul-
tural evolution ordinarily interacts significantly with devel-
opment (the “evo-devo” perspective) and should be analyzed
in that way.
It seems to me, however, that their account misunderstands
some aspects of current and recent directions by archaeolo-
gists employing evolutionary processes in an explanatory fash-
ion. These directions have developed largely in the Anglo-
American literature, drawing inspiration primarily from
biology and population genetics, whereas the approach taken
by Andersson et al. seems to stem ultimately from a systems
dynamical approach best exemplified, in recent archaeology,
by several of the contributions to van der Leeuw andMcGlade
(1997). Such approaches, in general, draw inspiration from
the nonlinear dynamics of physical systems and therefore have
trouble representing the population thinking that dominates
current evolutionary approaches in archaeology.
In my view, Andersson and colleagues get off somewhat
on the wrong foot by contrasting explanations derived from
evolutionary biology (their PA) with those provided by a par-
ticular approach to cultural evolution that they call the eco-
logical/economical approach (EA). This contrast in itself is
fine, but there seems to be little recognition that their EA is
9. Coincidentally, I have recently argued for incorporating some of
these same perspectives in complex-systems approaches to archaeology
(Kohler 2012:105–106).
only one possible way of applying evolutionary logic to the
analysis of cultural evolution. This in turn leads them to
suggest that evolutionary thinking by (Paleolithic) archaeol-
ogists “share[s] a common neo-Darwinian model of adap-
tation where natural selection is seen as the sole provider of
evolutionary direction.” If this statement is meant to represent
evolutionary thinking in archaeology more broadly, it is at
best only partially true.
Currently there are two major and not entirely independent
ways of approaching cultural evolution in archaeology (Shen-
nan 2012). One is indeed EA, which its proponents more
often call human behavioral ecology. The other, with foun-
dational texts by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd
and Richerson (1985), can be called dual inheritance theory
(DIT). This approach analyzes the transmission and relative
success of cultural variants as an inheritance system that is
linked to, but partially independent of, an underlying system
of genetic inheritance acting on the carriers of those cultural
traits. The logic of this approach is relevant here since the
partial independence of this trait transmission system allows
for neutral (with respect to selection) and even maladaptive
traits to proliferate under certain circumstances. Thus, the
framework already set up by DIT explicitly deals with “how
culture is organized, how it develops, and how it interacts
with other processes in the neo-Darwinian framework”
claimed by Andersson et al. to be lacking in an evolutionary
archaeology that is in their view guided by a too-facile de-
votion to an underlying model of adaptation. In the interests
of nonproliferation of theoretical constructs, Andersson et al.
might have considered developing their ideas within the con-
text provided by DIT. At a minimum, they should give clear
reasons for not doing so.
On a more positive side, I was pleased to see attention
given to clarifying the terms of the comparison being made
between evo-devo approaches in biological and in cultural
evolution. In biology, evo-devo approaches examine how
mechanisms affecting the development of the phenotypes of
individuals (through the interaction of their genotypes and
an environment) channel or bias the long-run evolution of
the population. How should we map these terms into cultural
evolution? Mesoudi et al. (2006:367) suggest that one ap-
proach (among several) would be to consider semantic in-
formation in brains or external storage devices (e.g., parietal
art) to be “like” the genotype and the eventual expression of
such acquired information (through behavior, language, ar-
tifacts, etc.) in some environment to be “like” the phenotype.
Then “cultural evo-devo” would study how the interaction
between semantic information and the natural and social en-
vironment shapes behaviors and artifacts and ultimately, at
the population level, the cultural evolutionary trajectory. As
in DIT approaches, the focus here is on the transmitted in-
formation. This in fact seems to be the approach taken here
as well: “Ideas, cultural representations, memes, routines, or
whatever we want to call them here, play a role roughly anal-
ogous to genes.”
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As Andersson et al. continue to develop these ideas, I would
urge them to better integrate their perspectives with existing
approaches to evolutionary archaeology and to be more aware
of intellectual antecedents (e.g., does Flannery’s [1968] atten-
tion to feedback processes not invalidate their claim to have
discovered in feedback relations “entirely new types of ex-
planations for the evolution of cultures”?); to be more explicit
about the structures of the populations being discussed (e.g.,
are intergroup competition and cultural group selection the
likely motor for the innovations they seek to understand?);
and to consider the implications of their arguments for the
study of causation in evolving sociotechnical systems (see,
e.g., Laland et al. 2011 on the necessity of employing reciprocal
causation to understand the behavior of such systems, pro-
viding a logical underpinning for employment of concepts
such as niche construction theory).
Manfred D. Laubichler
School of Life Sciences, Arizona State University; P.O. Box 4501,
Tempe, Arizona 85287-4501, U.S.A. (Manfred.laubichler@asu.edu).
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Claes Andersson and his coauthors argue that traditional
models of cultural evolution need to be expanded to include
elements of “evolutionary developmental theories” in order
to overcome the limitations of what they perceive as simplistic
applications of external selective dynamics in our understand-
ing of cultural and technological evolution. They take their
inspiration from similar debates within evolutionary biology
that have, over the last 3 decades, led to an expansion and
transformation of evolutionary theory. As a result, parts of
evolutionary theory—the newly emerging fields of develop-
mental evolution and evolutionary developmental biology
(evo-devo), two conceptually distinct, albeit related ap-
proaches—are now also focused on the origin of variation as
a distinct explanatory problem, one that requires understand-
ing the mechanisms of individual development as part of any
explanation of evolution.
One of the central questions for developmental evolution
has been the problem of innovation. In evolutionary biology,
innovation mostly refers to novel phenotypes, often those
connected to body plan evolution, that are not simply vari-
ations of already existing characters. The main challenge has
been to explain such phenotypic innovations in light of highly
conserved genes and especially gene numbers. Simply put,
comparative genomics has falsified the deceptively elegant as-
sumption that new phenotypic characters are simply the prod-
uct of new genes (remnants of this view are still widespread
in form of the “gene for” ideology). The answer to the prob-
lem of innovation is now found within the complex regulatory
architecture of the genome and its role in mechanistically
explaining development. In most basic terms, increasing evi-
dence suggests that (often small) changes in underlying gene
regulatory networks can explain the emergence of new char-
acters (innovations), while redundancy in and conservation
of specific parts of these networks at the same time explains
the long-term stability of other phenotypic features, such as
body plans.
Current developmental evolution has a well-developed re-
search program for studying phenotypic innovations, or more
precisely, inventions. Taking a lead from the economic theory
of innovation, developmental evolutionists have also adopted
Schumpeter’s distinction between invention and innovation,
where invention refers to the developmental origin of a novel
phenotype, whereas innovations are those inventions that suc-
cessfully spread though populations and leave a phylogenetic
signal. The latter then connect considerations of internal de-
velopmental mechanisms related to the origin of (novel) var-
iation with the external dynamics of natural selection.
But in the case of innovations or evolutionary novelties,
these external dynamics are not simply those of natural se-
lection. An innovation or a novel phenotypic character by
definition opens up a new niche or changes the dimensionality
of existing niches. Therefore, the new evolutionary theory of
innovation combines developmental mechanisms that can ex-
plain the origin of inventions with those processes that de-
scribe the constructive interactions of organisms with their
environment and with each other (niche construction, natural
selection).
As this brief overview of trends in current evolutionary
theory shows, Andersson et al.’s approach is grounded in a
broader framework of theoretical approaches that aim to un-
derstand innovation from a complex adaptive systems per-
spective. Their paper thus points to a larger theoretical ques-
tion: Is it possible to develop a unified theory of innovation
across domains that is based on insights derived from per-
spectives of developmental evolution, niche construction, and
complex adaptive systems?
In my view there is reason to be optimistic, but we have
a long way to go. Studies like Andersson et al.’s that try to
frame case studies about lithic technology within the context
of developmental evolution models, such as the external in-
novation cycle of cultural evolution, reveal the usefulness of
these novel perspectives beyond the narrow domain of re-
wiring gene regulatory networks and phenotypic evolution.
Research that analyzes patent data, institutional diversity, the
development and evolution of cities, or the dynamics of
knowledge systems all point in the same direction, namely
that innovation can be defined as specific shifts in the state
space of complex systems at the intersection of internal reg-
ulatory and external dynamics.
So where does this leave us? For once, this initial definition
of innovation is very abstract. Therefore, we need more em-
pirical case studies so that we can see to what degree inno-
vation dynamics are similar and different within and across
domains. Based on these descriptive cases, we also need to
build predictive models that can be tested. It is one thing to
frame cases of innovation within a specific theoretical point
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of view, such as developmental evolution or niche construc-
tion. But if we want to make real progress in understanding
innovation dynamics across scales, we need to have testable
hypotheses. Population biology and economical theory have
developed such models for the dynamics of variants within
populations; now we need to build similar models for the
origin of novelty and innovation. This paper is a step in that
direction.
Michael J. O’Brien and Stephen J. Lycett
Department of Anthropology, University of Missouri, 317 Lowry
Hall, Columbia, Missouri 65211, U.S.A./Department of Anthropol-
ogy, University of Kent, Marlowe Building, Canterbury, Kent CT2
7NR, United Kingdom (S.J.Lycett@kent.ac.uk). 3 VI 13
Cross-disciplinary endeavors such as the one reported here
are to be applauded, but there is of course inherent risk,
especially if one is entering somewhat unfamiliar territory.
This is where we see Anderson and colleagues, who, in an
effort to promote their evolutionary developmental approach
to cultural evolution, have either overlooked or ignored an
enormous body of literature that already views culture in the
way they suggest: as a system of descent with modification
mediated by the pillars of inheritance, variation, and sorting.
This oversight has led them to build a straw man and to
unknowingly reinvent a first-generation cultural evolutionary
wheel.
The authors, for example, are nowhere near the first be-
havioral scientists to examine culture from an “evo-devo”
perspective (e.g., Mesoudi and O’Brien 2008; O’Brien et al.
2010), and although they mention in passing niche construc-
tion theory (NCT), they apparently are unfamiliar with the
literally dozens of articles and journal issues devoted to NCT
and culture (e.g., Kendal, Tehrani, and Odling-Smee 2011;
Laland, Odling-Smee, and Myles 2010; O’Brien and Laland
2012). The myriad issues covered there are critical for the
kind of argument Andersson and colleagues are trying to
make: that, as Lewontin (1983:280) famously put it, “organ-
isms do not adapt to their environments; they construct them
out of the bits and pieces of the external world.”
Unfamiliarity with the literature, both biological and cul-
tural, leads Andersson and colleagues to state that in evolu-
tionary biology, “Natural selection is seen as necessary but
not sufficient for understanding the patterns of evolution. We
have argued that the corresponding move should be made in
the study of cultural evolution.”We have two comments. First,
in evolutionary biology, natural selection is not seen as nec-
essary. Rather, what is necessary is a mechanism that sorts
among variants. That mechanism could be, and often is, se-
lection, but it could also be stochastic sorting, or drift, which
is perfectly capable of “causing” evolution. Second, decades
of work on cultural evolution stemming from the efforts of
Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson
(1985), among others, have taken account of not only the
important role played by stochastic sorting but myriad other
aspects of a Darwinian cultural evolution. Importantly, cul-
tural evolution is not merely an analogy to, or metaphor for,
biological descent with modification but rather an evolution-
ary process mediated by variation, inheritance, and sorting
(Lycett 2011).
Of significance in the context of Andersson and colleagues’
discussion, archaeological studies have been at the forefront
of much of this work (e.g., Bettinger and Eerkens 1999; Eer-
kens and Lipo 2005; Lyman and O’Brien 1998; Mesoudi and
O’Brien 2009; Neiman 1995; O’Brien and Lyman 2000, 2002;
Shennan 2002), including those studies dealing specifically
with issues of variation within entities such as “Acheulean”
(e.g., Kempe, Lycett, and Mesoudi 2012; Lycett 2008, 2011),
which is the subject of Andersson and colleagues’ case studies.
Curiously, the authors cite several papers by Steven Kuhn,
and even thank him for “valuable discussions and feedback,”
but they ignore his insightful paper “Evolutionary Perspec-
tives on Technology and Technological Change” (Kuhn 2004).
Returning to the authors’ claim that selection is the only
visible process in cultural evolutionary research, they note
that the two dominant approaches to the study of Paleolithic
culture—one ecological/economic and the other physiologi-
cal—“share a common neo-Darwinian model of adaptation
where natural selection is seen as the sole provider of evo-
lutionary direction.” This simply is untrue, whether the sub-
ject is the Old World Paleolithic or the NewWorld Paleolithic.
If it were, why do we find articles with titles such as “An
Experimental Test of the Accumulated Copying Error Model
of Cultural Mutation for Acheulean Handaxe Size” (Kempe,
Lycett, and Mesoudi 2012) or “Acheulean Variation and Se-
lection: Does Handaxe Symmetry Fit Neutral Expectations?”
(Lycett 2008) or “The Accumulation of Stochastic Copying
Errors Causes Drift in Culturally Transmitted Technologies:
Quantifying Clovis Evolutionary Dynamics” (Hamilton and
Buchanan 2009)?
The last title brings us to a critical component that is all
but missing from Andersson and colleagues’ discussion,
namely, cultural transmission, which is the vehicle of cultural
inheritance. Ignoring the vast literature on transmission al-
lows the authors to state that culture is “notably absent from
the stage as a factor in its own evolution; there is no room
for explanations having to do with how culture is organized,
how it develops, and how it interacts with other processes in
the neo-Darwinian framework.” Again, this is an untrue and
naive statement. The authors might look, for example, at work
on the organization and evolution of cumulative culture (e.g.,
Enquist, Ghirlanda, and Eriksson 2011; Tomasello 1999). And,
even a cursory glance at any of the many works on NCT and
culture will completely undermine the notion that culture is
“notably absent from the stage as a factor in its own evolu-
tion.”
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Variation Gene mutation Evo-devo theory Cultural idea systems
Inheritance Mendelian inheritance Plasticity and accommodation Language and other symbolic forms of communication
Natural selection Population genetics Niche construction Generative grammars
Contingency Epigenetic inheritance Enculturation
Speciation and trends Replicator theory Cultural models
Evolvability Intentionality and purposeful behavior
Multilevel selection Recursive reasoning
Genomic evolution Theory of mind
Imitation/phenotypic inheritancea Technological systems
Social cognitiona Role systems




Note. Cols. 1–3: derived from figure 1.1 in Pigliucci and Mu¨ller (2010a). Col. 4: proposed extension addressing cultural and social evolution.
a Additions to Pigliucci and Mu¨ller’s expanded synthesis.
Dwight W. Read
Department of Anthropology and Department of Statistics, Uni-
versity of California, Los Angeles, California 90095, U.S.A.
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The authors credibly integrate some of the new ideas of the
expanded synthesis of evolutionary theory (Pigliucci and
Mu¨ller 2010b)—ideas that have expanded the modern syn-
thesis (Mayr and Provine 1980; table 1, cols. 1–3)—into a
developmental approach for explicating cultural evolution.
Relevant to their argument, the expanded synthesis can be
extended to encompass ideas relating to the evolution of so-
cial/cultural systems (table 1, col. 4).
Whereas the modern synthesis focused primarily on gene
evolution through mutation, inheritance, and natural selec-
tion, the expanded synthesis has focused on endogenous pro-
cesses affecting the development and expression of traits, not
just their selection as optimal solutions to externally imposed
change. The authors suggest that accounts of cultural evo-
lution should focus similarly on endogenous processes relat-
ing to the development and formation of cultural phenomena.
The goal is laudable; the means proposed for doing so are
incomplete.
The authors identify several processes central to the evo-
lution story applied to culture: the internal innovation cycle,
exaptive bootstrapping, the external innovation cycle, gen-
erative entrenchment, and a multilevel perspective. As the
authors note, none is specific to cultural evolution. Though
these provide a richer and more complete picture of the evo-
lutionary process than is obtained through focusing on traits
and trait selection alone, still unanswered is a fundamental
question: Why did the trajectory leading to Homo diverge
radically from the trajectory leading to Pan, despite both tra-
jectories having the same beginning point? Some have argued
incorrectly that cultural evolution defined as an extension of
biological evolution by including nongenetic traits transmit-
ted socially and having an impact on behavior makes the
difference.
The cultural side of Homo sapiens, though, is not deter-
mined through social transmission. As the authors comment,
in the neo-Darwinian framework there is “no room for ex-
planations having to do with how culture is organized, how
it develops, and how it interacts with other processes” (see
also Lane et al. 2009; Wimsatt and Griesemer 2007). Lacking
is a critical innovation transformation introduced during
hominin evolution that fundamentally redefined what con-
stitutes the evolutionary process with regard to the cultural
side of Homo sapiens (Read 2012; Read et al. 2009). The
transformation changed innovation from an externally ex-
ogenous random mutation process to “innovation that allows
for organizational change through endogenous processes act-
ing on an assessment of current organizational functionalities
[that] . . . did take place during hominin evolution” (Read
et al. 2009:44). This “innovation innovation” (Read et al.
2009) reversed the previous pattern of functionality at the
group level emerging from functionality at the individual
level, to functionality at the individual level being derived
from functionality introduced at the group level.
We can see the reversal in the development during the
Upper Paleolithic of “an external cognitive architecture by
which hominins achieved social extension within local groups
and a wider community” (Gamble 2010:32), thereby tran-
scending individually framed, cognitive abilities through
group-level organization of individual cognitive abilities. The
“cognitive architecture” enabling this social extension derives
from the “culturally constructed systems of kinship [that]
provide the basis for all the other culturally based forms of
social organization that arose with modern Homo sapiens”
(Leaf and Read 2012:19). Culturally constructed kinship sys-
tems whose organization is expressed linguistically through a
kinship terminology enabled social relations to be extended
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in time and space beyond the local group, and the boundary
of a community was thereby no longer limited by the scope
of face-to-face interaction, as is the case with the nonhuman
primates (Read 2012). Instead, the social system was trans-
formed into a relation-based form of social organization ex-
pressed linguistically through a kinship terminology system
(Read 2012). The culturally defined kinship terminology sys-
tem provides the foundation for the social organization of
hunter-gatherer societies from which more extensive forms
of social organization have evolved.
The kinship terminology system neither emerges from pat-
terned behavior of individuals (Leaf and Read 2012:16) nor
provides functionality except through the group level: indi-
vidually knowing a kinship terminology provides no func-
tionality to that individual. Instead, functionality for the in-
dividual arises from a group collectively having and sharing
a kinship terminology system, thus reversing the sequence for
the expression of functionality implied by neo-Darwinian evo-
lution. As a consequence, the social boundary for small-scale
societies is determined by those who can mutually determine
they are kin, using the kinship terminology as a symbolic
computational system (Read 2001, 2007); hence the boundary
became the consequence of an internal, rather than an ex-
ternal, process, in the manner discussed by the authors. The
reversal in the expression of functionality implies that cultural
evolution is not derived from evolution of individual traits,
genetic or otherwise, but from evolutionary processes acting
on the structure and organization of cultural idea systems
(Leaf and Read 2012:14).
Peter J. Richerson and Robert L. Bettinger
Department of Anthropology / Department of Environmental Sci-
ence and Policy, 1 Shields Avenue, University of California, Davis,
California 95616, U.S.A. (rlbettinger@ucdavis.edu) 1 VII 13
A Story Better Told Elsewhere
Andersson et al.’s critique of what they call the ecological/
economic and physiological approaches to Paleolithic culture
are well taken. In the case of humans, understanding our past
certainly depends upon an evolutionary theory of culture, as
they argue. However, they seem unaware of a large literature
on cultural evolution and gene culture coevolution making
the same point. It goes back to papers in the 1950s and 1960s
(Alchian 1950; Campbell 1960; Gerard, Rapoport, and Kluck-
hohn 1956). Mathematical modeling of the processes of cul-
tural evolution and gene-culture coevolution began in the
1970s, and major synthetic work was published in the 1980s
(Boyd and Richerson 1985; Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981;
Lumsden and Wilson 1981). For a recent book-length review
of the current state of the field, see Mesoudi (2011). Archae-
ologists and paleoanthropologists have been significant con-
tributors (e.g., Bettinger 1991; Eerkens and Lipo 2005; Powell,
Shennan, and Thomas 2009; Shennan 2002; Tostevin 2013).
The ability of geneticists to understand something of our
evolutionary and demographic history has turned up many
genes that are candidates to have been involved in episodes
of culture-led gene-culture coevolution (Laland, Odling-
Smee, and Myles 2010; Richerson and Boyd 2010).
Reply
We wish to thank the commenters for their valuable feedback
and hope that in this brief response we will be able to clarify
at least some of the issues that were raised. In retrospect, we
regret that our decision to take out a section on dual-inher-
itance theory (DIT) appears to have been a source of some
irritation and misunderstanding. O’Brien and Lycett, for ex-
ample, come away with the impression that what we suggest
is that culture ought to be viewed “as a system of descent
with modification mediated by the pillars of inheritance, var-
iation, and sorting.” No wonder that they think we are re-
inventing the wheel! Kohler summarizes this critique in a
constructive way: “Andersson et al. might have considered
developing their ideas within the context provided by DIT.
At a minimum, they should give clear reasons for not doing
so.” We will here try to do the latter, and by that to at least
partly do the former by explaining how DIT is related to the
proposed approach. Then we will move on to more specific
comments.
The choice overall was to contextualize our story more with
debates about transitions and large-scale patterns than with
debates about the modeling of microlevel mechanisms. We
see DIT as a valuable source of models, but our approach for
understanding the evolutionary process as a whole is very
different. As Laubichler argues, our work is to be understood
precisely as part of a greater project of understanding inno-
vation in complex adaptive systems—and by innovation we
mean radical rather than just gradual innovation.
DIT focuses strongly on population thinking—whether it
is selection, drift, or other sorting mechanisms that are in
action—as the key to the whole story of evolution. Let us
first stress that we have nothing against population thinking—
we think it is essential for understanding evolution, and it
interests us greatly (see, e.g., Andersson 2011a). But popu-
lation thinking is basically all that DIT can deal with, and we
think that more is needed. Boyd and Richerson (2005), for
example, describe DIT as a combination of population ge-
netics and rational choice theory, and we believe that this
does sum it up quite well. DIT never strays far from this set
of basic models, which also embody what is seen as the essence
of what it means to be scientific in the first place. These basic
tools bring analytical power, but they also bring strong con-
straints and biases in terms of what types of questions that
can be addressed. Radical innovation—that is, transformation
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of social structure through qualitative novelty—is something
that we think is absolutely central for understanding cultural
evolution, and it is not in the set of things that DIT does a
good job of modeling. Here we need also organization think-
ing (see Lane et al. 2009; Read and Lane 2008), although we
think Kohler is right that systemic perspectives have tended
to deemphasize population thinking too much. We do not
agree, however, with Kohler’s comment that “DIT explicitly
deals with ‘how culture is organized, how it develops, and
how it interacts with other processes.’”
We are certainly of the opinion that bottom-up modeling
is necessary for understanding cultural evolution—how
would we otherwise be able to understand emergence in com-
plex and massively parallel dynamical systems? But we do not
think that the microlevel can be seen as prior to higher levels
of organization. Microdynamics generates high-level organi-
zation—but high-level organization also scaffolds micrody-
namics so the arrow does not just point from the bottom and
up. Consequently, we think that it is important not to post-
pone the task of getting the macroscopic patterns right for
an undefined future (that we think will never arrive) where
they would be explained from the microlevel. Getting this
right, we think, demands being more methodologically syn-
thetic and broad than is the case with DIT.
As suggested by Richerson and Bettinger, let us consider
Alex Mesoudi’s (2011) book Cultural Evolution as a recent
and reasonably representative statement by a major contrib-
utor to the DIT tradition. We first note that Mesoudi covers
evolutionary developmental theory in about one page and
uses the term in a much narrower sense than we do—which
includes a host of partly aligned traditions that pay attention
to structure on meso and macro levels; see also table 1 in
Read’s comment. We concede that using the term the way
that we do can be confusing, even if we specify that we use
it as an umbrella term.
It is also instructive to see how Mesoudi (2011) differen-
tiates between a general Darwinian and a neo-Darwinian ac-
count of cultural evolution. He does this in a way that is very
different from ours and that illustrates why DIT researchers
probably find our account confusing: they may not agree with
us that DIT is neo-Darwinian. Mesoudi’s points include:
whether evolution is Darwinian or Lamarckian, whether
transmission is particulate or not, and whether variation is
blind or not. These are classical issues that have been de-
bated—in our opinion, with little obvious progress and con-
sequence—in the context of universal Darwinism, evolution-
ary economics, and DIT for a long time; we have participated
to some extent in that debate (e.g., Andersson 2008, 2011b).
Mesoudi concludes that cultural evolution is primarily Dar-
winian rather than neo-Darwinian. These points of differ-
entiation, however, represent more incremental adjustments
to the same formalist framework. The rise of developmental
thinking, by contrast, signifies a break with the view that
evolution can be understood on a single level of organisms
or genes, that is, solely in terms of population thinking; see
also Laubichler’s comment. While DIT importantly does chal-
lenge a number of standard neo-Darwinian assumptions, such
as by introducing frequency-dependent fitness and other se-
lection biases, the picture that Mesoudi paints (and that is
amply evident in the literature) is still fundamentally neo-
Darwinian on points that we see as much more significant
than those listed above.
We are well aware that—as O’Brien and Lycett point out—
some of the elements that we consider to be part of evolu-
tionary developmental theorizing—not least niche construc-
tion theory (NCT)—have been used previously in the context
of cultural evolution. But it is certainly true that the bulk of
the applications of NCT to culture has concerned how culture
affects genes. This is not without importance to us, but what
is more central to our argument is how culture affects culture.
That is, pointing the reciprocal arrow of causation in NCT
back from culture to culture. This is something that both
Odling-Smee and Laland (personal communication, 2013) see
as an interesting possible development of NCT that has not
been much pursued so far.
The points raised by Hovers and Belfer-Cohen about our
rendition of the MP-UP transition10 illustrate another effect
of strong competition for space in this paper. This is impor-
tant to respond to for two reasons. The first is that we main-
tain that although other resources besides meat were clearly
used during the MP (e.g., El Zaatari et al. 2011; Henry, Brooks,
and Piperno 2011), we find no evidence that the strong re-
liance on a big game meat diet during the MP (and indeed
well past it) as such would be in question. MP strategies for
utilizing plant resources do not appear to come close either
to MP hunting strategies in complexity or to plant-processing
strategies in the UP (Piperno et al. 2004; Revedin et al. 2010).
We would be inclined to interpret these as minor regimes,
while big game hunting would be the single major food-
getting regime. So although amore thorough case study would
go more into such details, we think that the main message
still stands.
The second is the question of how to evaluate the case
study examples. They are not unique predictions of the frame-
work, and the framework could easily be used for constructing
very different accounts—just like any Darwinian framework
can. There is a lot of room for disagreeing on how history
played itself out. What we advocate is a new way of concep-
tualizing the evolution of culture—not a single model of what
happened, although of course we have our favorite ideas,
subject to revision over time in the face of evidence.
This brings us to the issue of whether this is really a new
way of looking at cultural evolution. We readily admit that
we need to better integrate intellectual antecedents such as
Flannery. This includes also some of the recent work that
O’Brien and Lycett point us to, where O’Brien and others,
10. And partly to our hypothesized role of lithics, although we do
not see how their conclusion about the role of lithics flows from their
statement about its origins.
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for example, apply Michael Schiffer’s models (e.g., O’Brien
and Bentley 2011). Schiffer’s work has inspired us greatly, but
we do need to integrate this further. We are thereby certainly
not the first to find new ways of understanding cultural evo-
lution through feedback processes, and older systems theories
are treasure troves for our purposes. But there is an important
difference between systems theories and complex-systems the-
ories. Emergence—in the sense of macroscopic features being
irreducible (in practice or in principle; e.g., Bedau 1997, 2003;
Chalmers 2006)—is central to systems theories and complex-
systems theories alike. But while systems theories posit emer-
gence, complex-systems theories explicitly study emergence.
Systems theories predefine systems as “connected boxes” and
address the dynamics of these systems while complex-systems
theories ask how these “boxes” and their connections appear
and change over time. We think that combining these ap-
proaches to systems will be necessary, and that is the direction
in which we would like to go.
Davidson raises the question of whether the GBY really
represents a single culture that lasted across 50 ky. It is of
course very hard to have an intuition for whether that is
reasonable or not, but it does raise some interesting questions.
We think three points are worth mentioning in this context.
One is that parts of culture could be very persistent, while
other parts may be highly ephemeral. More specifically, some
of the “bottom parts” that we argue would be generatively
entrenched we think could survive both 50 and 500 ky and
much longer. We agree that there is ample room for trans-
mission failure and would like to additionally point to our
own work on precisely that issue (Andersson 2011a, 2013).
The second point is that the capacity of earlier hominins
for maintaining culture appears to have been consistently un-
derestimated. Recent research about the cultural capacity of
great apes suggests rethinking theminimal cultural capabilities
of early hominins. To take only one example, Mercader et al.
(2007) archaeologically trace chimpanzee nut cracking back
4,300 years; 4,300 surely is not 500,000, but 4,300 is a lower
bound, and H. erectus were not chimpanzees.
The third point is that the issue of culture and transmission
is typically posed as whether features are maintained using
transmission or whether they are externally stabilized (e.g.,
by properties of the raw material and hominin physiology)
and thereby cannot be properly described as cultural; this
pertains also to a comment by O’Brien and Lycett. But we
think one factor does not rule out the other. Say that limi-
tations apply on the capacity for transmitting cultural knowl-
edge (e.g., Andersson 2011a; Henrich 2004), would it not be
reasonable that artifacts that are strongly externally scaffolded
would be attractive since they would obtain a lot of stability
“for free” in terms of transmission? In our view, culture is
not just transmission—it is a whole system that stabilizes itself
by whatever means and that we could just as well describe as
autopoietic as being based on transmission.
We agree with Read that we did not address the question
of why Homo and Pan diverged culturally in such a drastic
way, and we view this as an example of a case that should be
pursued. We also agree that the question of group cohesion
and the notion that Homo reinvented a way of maintaining
large groups from scratch during the course of the Paleolithic
are highly interesting, and we think that it falls well into the
type of explanations that our framework is intended to help
producing. Concerning the expanded synthesis: finding a suit-
able umbrella term is a problem, and we thank Read for
pointing us to this table. The expanded synthesis, we would
like to note, is not as well synthesized as the modern synthesis,
and it contains methodological friction that the Modern Syn-
thesis did not contain.
Laubichler’s comment complements the article well by
making some of the arguments about the parallel biological
case much better than we were able to do it. We fully agree
that this is part of a greater project of understanding inno-
vation in complex adaptive systems, and we think this is also
what is so exciting about it: the interest for coming up with
such a theory is very wide, and we believe that it is the logical
next step that needs to be taken—rather than to keep holding
our breath for a single-level bottom-up understanding to ex-
plain it all.
—Claes Andersson, Anton To¨rnberg, and Petter To¨rnberg
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